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A man of prodigious fortune, coming to add his opinion to some light discussion that was going on casually at his table, began precisely thus: "It can only be a liar or an ignoramus who will say otherwise than," and so on. Pursue that philosophical point, dagger in hand. --Michel de Montaigne, Of the art of discussion. Stab back: cmnewman99-at-yahoo.com Home
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Oriana: la sibilla eremita The Sage of Baltimore: Browbeating the booboisie. Reason: As in voice of. Lileks: Il miglior fabbro Volokh: Dean of Kozinski clerks Olympia: I read her only for her literary qualities. Really. Say it isn't so!: Do you think it's the lumpy oatmeal? Our girl Jane: Keep em flying, Miss U.S.A. My man Baruch: Amor dei intellectualis. Hubba hubba. Scrofula: With a name like Scrofula, it has to be good. The Idler: No frills. IJ: Fighting the good fight. ACLU: Good when they remember what the L stands for. Yourish: Meryl smash. Heidi's letters: I think she does reprisals, too. Her pinkness: Each time she falls she shall rise again! And woe to the wicked! In Context: Lynn provides it. Andrea: One spleen to rule them all. Still Waiting: Don't believe the hype. The Droll Weevil: Posts, pedantry, and pie(?) Perugia: Second home. Craven Road n.7: His name is Dog. Dylan Dog. Tom Bell: Internet law, online where it should be. Just the place for a snark: I've told you but once, but it's true. Greed is Good: And doesn't look too shabby in a T-shirt, either. Translator's Buddy: Didn't have "gliridi" though. CGFA: Favorite source of desktop material. Fallacies: Check yourself. Cosmo for men.: Implementing our equal right to feelings of inadequacy. Caplan: Visit the Museum. There's just one hitch: But it's a good one. Samizdata: Libertarian lexicographers. Unqualified Offerings: But quality assured. She is Wendy: Hear her roar. The Divine Blogroll: Entrate, che troverete speranza. Like the corners of my mind: Read it and weep. Aziz: Providing perspective. IJTIHAD: The future of Islam. I hope. Himishi: Where I acquired that raw fish addiction. My generous sponsors Alan Moore: Quis custodiet? Spoonerism: A blushing crow to tyranny. The Onion: Scary thing is, they're not far off. ScrappleFace: More important news. Day by day: Trudeau Schmudeau. Fumento: Brockovich Crockovich My alma mater: Not basketball. Croquet. The Capitol Steps: providing their fodder is the government's only indispensible function Randy Andy: Get used to it. Vasco Rossi: When they're in Italy, the Stones open for him. The Shadow: Useful counterpoint. Italiani liberi: Dr. D. Vider's Italian minions. Friendly Neighborhood Sinners: Swim the warm waters. Yuppies of Zion: The blog with two backs. Hobbit's repast: I'm partial to onesies, myself. The Friesian School: going Diderot one better Head spinning?: They can help. Looking sinister: Brian is watching. Murray's ghost: Stalking the state. Hell, no.: So anti it's not always clear what they're pro. Bureaucrash: takin' it to the streets Joe Cartoon: Indulge your inner 12 year old boy. There's a light: Rand sans droid. The Fake Detective: Rescuing damsels in dis-dress. Stromata: Amazing how much good stuff some people leave just lying around. The VRWC: Conspiring at a law school near you. The VLWC: Practicing the sincerest form of flattery. Corriere della Sera: Haven't sued me yet. Who am I?: Che ti frega? |
Wednesday, March 26, 2003
WHEREAS: Reading news sites, weblogs, email, and other internet-based media, while in certain respects a valuable and enriching activity, is also an extremely addictive and easy way to idly fritter away an unconscionable amount of time that might otherwise be devoted to other activities that are equally or more valuable and enriching; IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED THAT: Starting immediately, the signer of this post shall not open or use any web browsing software on any computer or other electronic device unless he has already that day spent at least two full hours engaged in one or more of the following activities: Reading a book. Interacting with family members. Engaging in physical exercise. Writing something other than a weblog post. Signed March 26, 2003, Chris Newman Thursday, March 13, 2003
Oriana on Iraq: I'd been waiting for this. And she says pretty much what I thought she'd say. As always, she's a bit over the top but mainly on target. And she has the same concern I expressed below about post-war Iraq. But I don't know if I buy the idea that we could or should have taken out Saddam in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Half the world was opposed to us even taking out the Taliban, for chrissakes! I think we needed to get resolution 1441 first, to go before the world in good faith and try to get them on board. Now that they've refused, history will decide who was wrong. Oriana asserts without explaining that 9/11 wouldn't have happened if Bush I had finished the job. A lot of people will take her to task for that. It's obviously impossible to know with certainty what would have happened, but I think a causal connection is very plausible. The 9/11 bombers were Saudis. We know that public opinion of the Bin Ladenite persuasion was severely inflamed by the stationing there of our troops throughout the 90's, and that this was one of his primary grievances against us. And why did we need to have those troops there? To "contain" Saddam. Remember how indefinite containment is the peaceful solution? Her apology to Blair is classic Oriana, both in its megalomania (because, of course, his standing in the world is dependent on her approval don't you know) and its heartwarming passion. She admires integrity more than anything, and the guy deserves the praise. My bet is that she wrote this in Italian and translated it herself into English. Wonder if the original was published there. Tuesday, March 11, 2003
I finally got around to reading Jim Henley's attempted debunking of Kenneth Pollack. I have some problems with it. Here's the first one: Pollack cites three Iraqi defectors whose positions would have given them access to the truth about Iraq's nuclear program. All three apparently reported that the program was bigger and better concealed than the international inspectors had believed. Jim, citing Hesiod, points out that one of these defectors, Kamel, called another, Hamza, a "professional liar" who had provided some forged documents. From this, Jim concludes that Kamel and Hamza "can't both be telling the truth." Well, not about everything perhaps. But the only proposition for which Pollack is citing them is that Iraq had a concealed nuclear program. If in fact they both reported this, then with regard to that point they must both be telling the truth. Or both lying. Indeed, when two people who otherwise criticize each other agree on some point, we usually take that to corroborate it, not undermine it. And here, unless Pollack is lying, they're both corroborated by a third defector that Jim hasn't given us any reason to doubt, other than generalized caution that not every defector is "noble or reliable." Fair enough. Maybe they're saying what they know we want to hear. But the other doubt-engendering possibility Jim raises--that these guys are plants that Saddam deliberately sent out--seems fanciful. What does Saddam have to gain from telling the world that there's a secret nuclear program? If Kamel had called Hamza a liar and said there was no remaining nuclear program, the idea that maybe he was sent out deliberately to discredit Hamza would make sense. The way I read the interview excerpts Hesiod quoted, it sounds like Kamel was saying "That guy doesn't really know what he's talking about. I'm the guy with the real goods." But he's not disputing what kind of goods they are, and that's the crucial point. Jim also doesn't comment on Hesiod's addendum: It just occurred to me why the Bush administration is so blatantly lying about what Kamal said, and is contantly hyping the quality of the information he provided. Might it be that Pollack doesn't give us all the details about why we believe these defectors because he can't for reasons like those Hesiod identified? Ultimately, the problem comes down to this: Do you believe it to be possible that there could exist a weapons program hidden in Iraq that the inspectors didn't find? If the answer is yes, and you're concerned about responding to that possibility, you can't set your standards of proof at a level that are impossible to meet. Trust me, I share Jim's dislike of giving the government the benefit of the doubt on things like this. They have lied before. But we also have to look at things in context. It's not like we're faced with some Allende figure and the CIA is saying trust us, we have to get rid of him because he'll never relinquish power. We're talking about a fully actualized mass murdering totalitarian who nobody doubts would give nearly anything to see us fry. Under those circumstances, I think we give the benefit of the doubt to defectors, and to our elected officials when they tell us they have the goods even if they can't show all of them to us yet. And if they turn out to have lied to us, we should hold them responsible. But right now that's the kind of call we put them there to make, and it can't be a prerequisite for action that they first present all of us with direct declassified evidence beyond any reasonable doubt. An answer to my question: I asked below whether there would be any justification for preventing a newly-constituted Iraqi state from choosing to acquire WMD. Lee Harris has an answer. A very interesting one. Monday, March 10, 2003
Friday, March 07, 2003
Was I the only one who thought this question a little strange the other night? Q Thank you, sir. Mr. President, millions of Americans can recall a time when leaders from both parties set this country on a mission of regime change in Vietnam. Fifty thousand Americans died. The regime is still there in Hanoi, and it hasn't harmed or threatened a single American in the 30 years since the war ended. What can you say tonight, sir, to the sons and the daughters of the Americans who served in Vietnam to assure them that you will not lead this country down a similar path in Iraq? We went into Vietnam to effect regime change in Hanoi? Really? I always thought we were in there trying to prop up a regime in the South that Hanoi wanted to change. And that one of the main reasons the war was unwinnable was precisely that going for actual regime change in Hanoi was off the table politically. Nor, I think, was there ever any claim at the time that if Hanoi won it would directly harm or threaten Americans. Not in the way the present administration fears Iraq will do. The concern in Vietnam was about dominos and world communism. So what was the point of this analogy again? I forgot. Maybe what he meant was that if we get stuck having to defend a new Iraqi government against some VC-like form of Islamic insurrection, it could wind up looking like Vietnam. Only without the jungle. And probably without anyone willing to play the role of Hanoi, after seeing what happened to the Taliban and Saddam. Which could still be ugly, don't get me wrong. But it has precious little to do with Vietnam. But here's what does bother me. Bush said the Iraqi people will choose their own form of government, and whatever they choose will be better than Saddam. That's probably true; it's a pretty low bar. But will whatever they choose be enough to provide the paradigm-changing beacon in the Middle East that the neocons are counting on? Suppose, for example, that the new democratic Iraqi electorate elects some hardcore Islamists to power. It's not impossible, is it? I'm not even talking Taliban here; let's imagine people genuinely committed to abiding by the rules of democracy, but just with a serious Islamist policy agenda. Sort of like if some Pat Robertson-type got elected here. And suppose this new government complies with all the UN disarmament resolutions, but passes democratically some laws restricting the rights of women? Or decides to continue providing "humanitarian assistance" to Palestine in the form of subsidies to families of suicide bombers? What do we do then? Or suppose they decide to start building their own WMD? Remember, this is a brand new government that we have legitimized, and they have no ties to the history of Baathist aggression. So what right do we have to tell a new sovereign regime that hasn't hurt anyone yet that they can't build defensive nukes just like we can? The thing is, any way you look at it we're going to be more than disinterested bystanders when the Iraqi people "choose their own government." We will have invested quite a lot in giving them the ability to do so, and not all outcomes of that process will make our investment worthwhile. But if we have too heavy a hand in the process, the result will be perceived not as a real representative Iraqi state, but just a U.S. puppet. Ironically, the only sure way to prove to the world (or that part of it even willing to entertain proof that we are not bent on world conquest) that the new Iraq is not a puppet state is for the new Iraq to have policies we clearly don't like. So what is the bare minimum we do insist on? Clearly, there has to be some constitution providing for a democratic process and protecting freedom of political speech. We'll want something in there guaranteeing equal treatment of religious and racial groups. But beyond that? What if they go socialist? Do we let them? I think we have to, though it would diminish our great hopes to see a prosperous Arab country. If we want to live up to our word as liberators and not imperialists, we have to give them enough liberty to do some really dumb things, and have faith that the democratic process will correct them through experience. Thursday, March 06, 2003
Why I'll never call myself a geek again: I am not worthy. I come pretty close in some ways, though. I definitely participate in the eidos of geekiness, even if I have never beheld its full effulgence. I did spend all of junior high hurling plastic multicolored icosahedra. And half of high school buying Monty Python records. (See Terry, it hurt me as much as it did you.) Culturally, I'm a fellow traveller. It's just that while I enjoy technology, I've never been hardcore enough about it to bother knowing more than the minimum I need to do what I want to do at the moment. I had some fun writing programs in college on my Apple IIc. But they were pretty basic--and in Basic, at that. So maybe I'm a half-geek. Oh yeah, link via Instapundit. (As though anyone reading this didn't already see it there!) Wednesday, March 05, 2003
Tuesday, March 04, 2003
A random thought on standards of evidence. Lots of Europeans are upset with us now because we rejected Kyoto. And because we think we need to remove Saddam. Apparently, there's not sufficient evidence that Saddam will develop and use WMD if left in power, or that removing him from power is the only sure way to prevent this. But the same people who say so apparently believe there is sufficient certainty that the greenhouse effect will cause global catastrophe, and that drastically cutting CO2 emissions is the only sure way to prevent this. Many in this country would rate the accuracy of these two predictions the other way around. I wonder what's behind that. There are similar dynamics at play in each judgment. By that I mean that one can ascribe ulterior motives to those who come down on both sides of each question. With regard to the Europeans about whom I'm generalizing, the suspected ulterior motives would be the same in each case: desire to bureaucratize and socialize the world, and specifically to subordinate both American military and economic power to global regulation. On the American side, the posited motives would also be consistent: desire to control and consume the world's natural resources without constraint. It's also true in each case that the cost of the proposed remedy to the predicted threat is evaluated differently by each side. The antiwar position expects as many as 100,000 people will be killed in Iraq, and finds even one death unjustifiable. The pro-war side doesn't think anywhere near that many will actually die, and views those deaths as outweighed by those likely to occur if Saddam is left in power. The anti-Kyoto side sees it as leading to catastrophic economic consequences for no purpose, while the pro-Kyoto side tends to regard shrinking the economy as a good thing anyway. These factors are obviously part of what causes the differences in judgment. The greater the cost you ascribe to the remedy, and the more you distrust the side claiming there's a threat, the higher you set the standard of proof. But let's try to abstract from these factors and imagine that these risks are being evaluated purely on the basis of objective, rational judgment applied to the available evidence. Which of these two predictions about future risks has greater claim to be regarded as reliable? I can imagine the arguments for and against either side. To some extent it would be the old question of qualitative versus quantitative judgment. The Kyoto forces will point to their crunchy numbers and computer models, and disparage the psychological judgment calls being made about Saddam. Their opponents will argue that the models are inaccurate, and point to the information we have about Saddam's mentality, past actions, and stated aspirations. Which side would win? Is there any meaningful way to render the two judgments commensurable so as to compare them? If you think I'm going to try to answer this one, you're crazy. But I wish somebody would. Tell me, what's more certain: the behavior of a tyrant, or the state of the weather in fifty years? |